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Abstract
We assume that central banks can control inflation so that inflation rates re-
flectthepreferencesofthecentralbankcouncil.Thehypothesistobetestedis
thatthesepreferencesdependonthecentralbankers’educationaland/orpro-
fessional background. In a panel data analysis for the euro area and eleven
countriessince1973,weexplaininflationfirstbytheweightswhichthevarious
educational and professional characteristics occupy in the central bank coun-
cil and second by the education or profession of the median central bank
council member. Our results indicate that, with regard to professional back-
ground, former members of the central bank staff as well as former bankers
and businessmen have the strongest inflation aversion and that former trade
unionists and politicians seem to have the highest inflation preference.As for
the education of the council members,our results are less robust.However,if
themedianmemberofthecentralbankcouncilhasstudiedbusiness,theinfla-
tion rate is significantly lower than if she has studied economics.
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When central banks are independent with regard to monetary policy,the out-
come depends on the policy preferences of the central bankers. What shapes
their preferences? Several factors have been discussed and analyzed in the lit-
erature. Firstly, central bankers may be influenced by public opinion as ex-
pressed in the media (Havrilesky 1993; Froyen et al. 1997; Maier et al. 2002;
Maier, Bezoen 2004; Maier, Knaap 2003) or in opinion surveys (Hayo 1998;
Vaubel 2003).Secondly,they may respond to the demands of specific interest
groups (von Bonin 1979; Havrilesky 1990; Posen 1993a, b; Hefeker 1997).
Thirdly,theymayfeelloyaltothepartywhichhasappointedthem(McGregor
1996;Vaubel 1993,1997 a,b).Fourthly,they may pay attention to the wishes of
the current government even though they enjoy policy independence.Fifthly,
their views may have been shaped by their education and their professional
background (von Bonin 1979;Vaubel 1993,Anhang 2).
In this paper,we analyze whether and how the education and professional ca-
reer of central bankers affect their inflation preferences.This is important be-
cause it will inform governments and the public how the appointment of cen-
tral bank members can lead to price level stability. We assume that central
banks – with a lag of about two years – can control inflation by using their
monetary policy instruments.1 This presupposes that they know fairly accu-
rately how the demand for (central bank) money is changing over time.Edu-
cationandprofessionalcareeraffecttheinflationpreferencesofcentralbank-
ers because they convey knowledge about the effects of inflation.In addition,
professional experience may generate personal loyalties to special interest
groups:a profession or industry,a party,a bureaucracy,an income group etc.
We have collected information on the educational and professional histories
of 391 central bank council members from eleven countries over the time pe-
riod 1973–1998 (for three of them until 2001) and for the European central
bank in 1999–2003. We estimate cross-section time-series regressions which
also allow for the independence of the central bank and the exchange rate re-
gime.
The structure of the paper is as follows.In section 2,we formulate hypotheses
about the influence of education and professional experience on the inflation
preferences of central bankers.Section 3 summarizes our data for each of the
twelve central banks and compares them.Section 4 presents the econometric
results.Section 5 sums up.
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1 For recent demonstrations that the trend of monetary expansion relative to the trend of output
growth is a good predictor of the inflation rate see von Hagen (2004) and Neumann/Greiber
(2004).2. Hypotheses
Fromatheoreticalpointofview,themaindifferencebetweeneducationaland
professional influences is that only the professional influence may reflect the
activity of organised interest groups. For example, the banking industry may
delegate some of their members to the central bank council.Alternatively,of
course, the inflation preferences of bankers may be due to a ”déformation
professionelle”, and in the same way, there may be a ”déformation éducatio-
nelle”.
As for the university education,we distinguish economists,former students of
business administration,lawyers and engineers.One might assume that econo-
mists have the best qualification for central banking.They should know more
about macroeconomics (notably monetary economics), international eco-
nomics and the principles of economic policy. However, depending on
whether they have received a Keynesian or a monetarist education and
whethertheyhavestudiedwithaleft-leaningoraconservativeprofessor,their
economics training may have raised or lowered their preferred inflation rate.
Thus,theirinflationpreferenceistheoreticallyambiguous.Buteconomistsare
more likely to attain the inflation rate which they prefer.
Withregardtomonetarypolicy,formerstudentsofbusinessadministrationare
probably more competent than lawyers and engineers. The latter are most
likely to miss their inflation targets.At the same time,former students of busi-
ness administration, law and engineering are probably altogether more con-
servative than the average economist because inflation interferes with their
activities.However,since they do not know very well how monetary policy af-
fects inflation, they may be more responsive to the wishes of the politicians
who have appointed them – notably at election time. Thus, it is an open issue
whethertoexpectahigherorlowerinflationratefromthesenon-economists.
With regard to professional background, we distinguish bankers2, insurance
executives, businessmen, economic scholars, central bank staff, trade unionists,
ministerial and other civil servants3 as well as politicians.4
First of all, what do economic theory and evidence tell us about the inflation
preferences of the various interest groups? We expect that union leaders,poli-
ticiansandministerialcivilservantsonaveragepreferhigherinflationratesbe-
causemanyofthemwishtouseinflationtoredistributeamongincomegroups,
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2 Thegroup“bankers”includescommercialandpublicbankers,butnoformercentralbankstaff.
3 The group “other civil servants”includes persons who have worked with international organi-
sations or public banks.
4 See Table 7 in the appendix for a complete description of the variables.reduce real government debt or engineer pre-election booms.5 According to
Hibbs’ partisan theory (1977),unionists and left-wing politicians are most in-
clined to seek redistribution by unexpected inflation.
By contrast,we expect that bankers,as an interest group,prefer low inflation.
As Chen (2004) has shown,inflation has a significantly negative effect on the
real profits of German commercial banks (even though it raises the interest
ratespreadbetweenbankcreditsanddeposits,probablyduetomoneyillusion
on the part of depositors).Inflation affects bank profits negatively because,as
Boyd et al.(2001) demonstrate,it reduces the liquid liabilities of the financial
sectorrelativetoGDP(grossdomesticproduct):investorsturnawayfromde-
positstorealassetsandequity.Hefeker(1997)arguesthatbankersand(other)
businessmen should have similar interests because the profits of business are
used to repay the loans. Large exporters, it is true, may be interested in infla-
tionarysurpriseswhichtemporarilyleadtoarealdepreciationofthecurrency.
More generally, unanticipated inflation temporarily reduces real wages and
real interest rates ex post.But if inflation has to be reduced after the election,
the reverse is true. Traditionally, bankers and businessmen support conserva-
tive political parties which aim at low inflation. Thus, we expect that not only
bankers but the whole business community prefers low inflation.
Insurance executives prefer low risk for their assets. They aim at stable infla-
tion rates,and since low inflation rates tend to be most stable6,they vote in fa-
vour of price level stability.
Second,how does the professional background affect the personal independ-
ence of central bankers? Council members from the private sector are more




3. A descriptive analysis of the data
Table1summarizestheeducationalandprofessionalbackgroundofthemem-
bers of the central bank governing council in eleven countries (1973–1998)7
and the European Monetary Union (1999–2003 and 1999–2001).8 We have
6 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
5 The political economy of inflation is surveyed in Vaubel (1997a).
6 For a recent study see Davis,Kanago (1998,Table 2).
7 The data for Portugal are only available from 1980 onwards.
8 The numbers in the Table indicate the percentages of total man years in the council accounted
for by each background. The percentages sum to 100 in each column in each panel (except for
rounding errors). The last row indicates the compound average rate of consumer price inflation













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.collected these data from various ”Who’s who?” volumes, central bank
websites and personal enquiries with central banks and former governing
council members.Only four central bank members could not be classified ac-
cording to education and professional background. The governing council as
defined in this paper is the body charged to “formulate the monetary policy ...
including, as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objec-
tives,key interest rates and the supply of reserves”(Article 12.1 of the statute
of the ECB).Our sample of 395 council members includes only those entitled
to vote.If a council member has studied more than one subject or has worked
in more than one profession, we allocate equal fractions to these different
backgrounds.With regard to profession,we distinguish the last position prior
to being appointed to the council and the whole career.
With regard to education,Table 1 reveals that economists used to have an ab-
solute majority in the central banks of Denmark,Portugal,the United States,
the Netherlands, the European Monetary Union, Germany and Finland (in
descending order).They were also the largest group in Belgium and the U.K.
Bycontrast,thelargestgroupintheFrenchandAustriancentralbankcouncils
hadstudiedlaw.Alawbackgroundisalsoquitefrequent(accountingformore
than 30 per cent) in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Finland. 20 per cent or
moreofthe”knowns”intheAustrian,theU.S.andtheU.K.centralbankcoun-
cilshavestudiedbusiness.10percentormoreofthe“knowns”inFrance,Aus-
tria,the U.K.and Belgium have a degree in engineering.
Central banks with an absolute majority of economists exhibit an (unweight-
ed) average rate of inflation of 5.4 per cent against 4.4 per cent for the others.
In the five countries in which more than 30 per cent of the council members
had studied law,the average inflation rate was 4.3 per cent.
It should be noted that the share of members with an economics training is
muchhigherintheECBCouncil(62percent)than,onaverage,inthemember
central banks covered by Table 1 (49 per cent).The ECB Council is composed
of the twelve national central bank governors and six executive directors.
While the national central bank councils contain quite a few non-economists,
the governor is usually an economist, and, for the Board of Executive Direc-




analysis, Table 2 aggregates these data in four groups: private sector back-
ground (bankers, insurance executives, businessmen, farmers, practicing law-
yers)andpublicorpoliticalsectorbackground,andwithinthepublicorpoliti-
cal sector we distinguish monetary policy experts (central bankers, economic
scholars) and non-experts (politicians, labour union leaders and civil ser-
8 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubelvants). The group from the private sector had a majority in Austria, the U.K.
and Denmark. It was smallest in Belgium, Germany, EMU and the Nether-
lands. Within the public or political sector, the group of monetary policy ex-
perts (central banker, economic scholars) occupied the largest share in the
Netherlands (57 per cent), Switzerland (48 per cent), the EMU (43 per cent)
andtheU.S.(42percent).Non-expertsfromthepublicsectorhadthemajority
in Portugal (58 per cent), Belgium (57 per cent), Germany (54 per cent) and
Finland (53 per cent).
Inthethreecountriesinwhichmembersfromtheprivatesectorusedtohavea
majority,the(unweighted)inflationaveragehasbeen5.4percent,intheother
countries 4.8 per cent. Within the latter group, those countries in which
non-experts from politics and the civil service commanded a majority,experi-
enced an average inflation rate of 6.2 per cent (with a very large cross-sec-
tional variance).
However,itisimpossibletodrawanyfirmconclusionsaboutpreferencesfrom
these comparisons because they ignore the political constraints (the exchange
rate regime and functional dependence) under which these central bankers
have pursued their preferences.
Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation 9
Descriptive statistics of the professional background, last position1






Austria 69 32 1 31
Belgium 9 91 34 57
Denmark 57 43 36 7
Germany 10 89 35 54
Finland 31 69 16 53
France 29 72 27 45
The Netherlands 17 83 57 26
Portugal 33 67 9 58
Switzerland 22 78 48 30
UK 65 36 27 9
US 38 63 42 21
ECB5 14 86 43 43
Data collected by the authors.– 1Excluding “others”and “unknowns”.– 2Bankers,insurance exe-
cutives, businessmen, farmers. – 3Central bankers, economic scholars. – 4Politicians, trade unio-
nists,civil servants.– 51999–2001.
Table 24. A cross-section time-series analysis
For our analysis we estimate cross-section time-series regressions. The first
specification includes only observations with an independent central bank9
and a flexible exchange rate regime10,i.e.:
(1) πθ η ε jt i ijt t jj t
i
bb x =+ + ++ − ∑ 02
where
πjt : consumer price inflation in country j in year t,
xijt −2 : percentage share of educational or professional background i in country j in year t–2,
θ : series of time dummies,
η : series of country dummies and
ε : disturbance term.
The identification strategy of a linear regression model implies that the infla-
tionrateasthedependentvariabledoesnotaffecttheappointmentofthecen-
tral bank council members regarding their educational and political back-
ground.This assumption seems to be justified because we assume that mone-
tary policy decisions affect the inflation rate with a lag of about two years as
most econometric estimates indicate.11
The regression does not include any economic determinants of inflation (such
asmonetaryexpansion,theinterestrateoroutputgrowth)becauseweassume
thatcentralbankerseithercontrolthesevariablesortakethemintoaccountas
they employ their monetary policy instruments to attain their ideal inflation
rates. We add dummies for each year and for each country (fixed effects) un-
less indicated otherwise, but the coefficients of the year dummies are not re-
ported.12 In a second specification, we will later also allow for the independ-
ence of the central bank and the exchange rate regime.13 We have also experi-
mented with the average age of council members because it may affect their
10 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
9 In this paper the definition of central bank independence is based on Masciandaro/Spinelli
(1994) who provide ranking indices of functional independence for the 21 OECD central banks.
With our sample of countries,the number of ranks dropped from seven to six.Central banks are
defined as functionally independent if they have one of the three highest ranks.
10 The exchange rate regime is classified as flexible when there is no parity or reference rate
vis-à-vis another currency or if the central bank is the hegemon of a parity system (as the German
BundesbankdominatedtheEuropeanMonetarySystem).OursourceisMicrosoftEncartaEncy-
clopedia 2000.
11 For a recent demonstration see European Central Bank,Monthly Report,July 2000.We have
also tried a three-year lag,the results are very similar.
12 If central bankers have not only inflation targets but also country- or time-specific output or
employment targets,these should be captured by the dummies.
13 Almostallstudiesanalyzingmonetarypoliticalbusinesscyclesortheeffectofcentralbankin-
dependence on inflation ignore the exchange rate regime.Notable exceptions are Jonsson (1995),
Leertouwer,Maier (2001) and Vaubel (2003).independence, their preferred inflation rate and their ability to attain it. But
the effect turned out to be insignificant and did not change the results.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results for a regression only on the educa-
tional background.The central bankers who have studied economics are used
as the reference group.All coefficients are negative but only former students
of “other subjects”(including languages,philosophy,psychology etc.) prefer a
significantly lower inflation rate than economists do. Jointly, the explanatory
variables are marginally insignificant at the five per cent level.
Column 2 of Table 3 replicates the analysis for the professional background as
measured by the last position held before appointment to the central bank
council. The reference group is politicians. Except for the trade unionists, all
professional groups have negative coefficients but,at the five per cent level of
significance,only former insurance executives,central bank staff,bankers and
businessmen prefer a significantly lower inflation rate than politicians (and
tradeunionists)do.If,forexample,theshareofinsuranceexecutivesincreases
by one percentage point (at the expense of former politicians), the inflation
rate drops by about 0.4 percentage points. There is no significant difference
between politicians and trade unionists, economic scholars or civil servants,
ministerialorother,atthefivepercentlevel.Testsofsignificanceofthediffer-
ences between non-reference groups show inter alia that former economic
scholars and other civil servants have a significantly higher inflation
preference than former central bank staff and insurance executives. The ex-
planatory variables are jointly significant at the one per cent level.
In Column 3 of Table 3, the professional background is measured over the
whole career rather than by the last position of the council member.The coef-
ficient of former central bank staff remains significantly negative and in-
creases in size. Moreover, the non-ministerial civil servants take a large and
significant negative coefficient.In the following,we focus on the last position
because it has more explanatory power as measured by the adjusted R2.
Column 4 of Table 3 combines the educational and professional background
variables. All educational differences drop to insignificance. That is not sur-
prising because the educational and the professional variables are clearly cor-
related.Withregardtotheprofessionalbackground,formercentralbankstaff,
commercial bankers and businessmen are still significantly more infla-
tion-averse than politicians and trade unionists at the five per cent level.
The inflation preferences of the council members cannot exert themselves
without constraint unless the exchange rate is flexible and the central bank is
independent. But even if the government fixes an exchange rate parity, there
will be margins of fluctuation and the central bank council may yield some
power of persuasion over the minister of finance when a parity adjustment is
Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation 11considered. Monetary policy advice from the central bank council may even
matterwhenthecentralbanklacksindependence.Thus,asanextstep,weshall
simultaneously analyse four different regimes:
12 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
Regression on the educational and professional background for an independent central bank
and flexible exchange rate system – fixed effects
Dependent variable:inflation rate lagged two years
Variable


























































































F-Test 7.39 8.59 17.69 10.39
Adjusted R2 0.7255 0.7711 0.7306 0.7905
F-Test of joint significance
of edu./prof.variables
2.20 4.07 2.86 3.01
p-value4 0.0675 0.0006 0.0086 0.0026
Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statistics in parentheses.– Number of observations:92.See appendix Table 7 for a description of
the variables. Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year. –
1The reference group is economics. – 2The reference group is politicians. – 3The reference group
fortheeducationvariablesiseconomics.Thereferencegroupfortheprofessionvariablesispoliti-
cians.– 4p-value of the F-Test-statistics of joint significance.
Table 3R1 : flexible exchange rate and independence,
R2 : fixed exchange rate and independence,
R3 : flexible exchange rate and dependence,
R4 : fixed exchange rate and dependence.
Each Rk is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the specified regime prevails and
which is equal to zero otherwise. The dummies are multiplied by the educa-
tional and/or professional variables:
(2) πθ η ε jt ik ijt jkt t jj t
ik
bb x R =+ ⋅ ⋅ + ++ −− ∑ 02 2 .
Weexpectthattheimpactoftheeducationaland/orprofessionalsharesonin-
flation diminishes as the constraints (k) increase.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating specification (2) with regard to both
education and professional background.14 With a flexible exchange rate and
central bank independence (column 1), there remains the significantly nega-
tive effect for former central bank staff.In the other regimes,there are signifi-
cantly negative coefficients for bankers, economic scholars and businessmen
as well as, with regard to education, for former students of business and
“other” or “unknown” subjects. By contrast, a law degree significantly raises
therateofinflationincolumn2.Whileformercentralbankstaffaffectsthein-
flation rate by their independent action,the significance of these other groups
might derive from their ability to persuade the government. The explanatory
variables are jointly significant under each regime.
So far we have applied a mean voter framework instead of a median voter ap-
proach. However, central bank councils decide by simple majority and bar-
gaining(“logrolling”)betweencouncilmembersislikelytobelimitedbecause
the issue space tends to be one-dimensional. However, the regression coeffi-
cientoftheshareestimatescanbeusedtoranktheinflationpreferencesofthe
various members and determine the median. As is turns out, we also have to
rank coefficients which are not significantly different from each other but this
weakness may be outweighed by the advantage of using the correct voting
procedure. We regress the inflation rate on dummies indicating the educa-
tional and/or professional background of the median council member. Since
some of the background characteristics never apply to a council median, the
number of explanatory variables declines.
Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation 13
14 Separate estimates for education or professional background are reported in the Appendix
(Tables 8 to 10).Empty cells are caused by dropped variables if there are no observations for this
regime or if the variable is time-invariant (for example a share of constantly x per cent). Rarely,
dropouts are due to collinearity.Table 5 presents the results for the educational background (fixed effects) if
the exchange rate is flexible and the central bank is independent.15 As before,
14 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
Regression on the educational and professional background (last position) – fixed effects
















































































































F-Test of joint significance
of edu./prof.variables
2.89 7.88 8.71 5.70
p-value4 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statisticsinparentheses.Totalnumberofobservations:291.Thenumberofobservationsforeach
regimeisindicatedattheheadofthecolumns.SeeappendixTable7foradescriptionofthevaria-
bles.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The referen-
ce group for the education variables is economics. The reference group for the profession
variables is politicians.– 4p-value of the F-Test-statistics of joint significance.
Table 4
15 Thenumberofobservationsdropsto79becausein13observationsthemedianwasindetermi-
nate,i.e.,the council was exactly split in halves.the reference group is economics.If we take the t-statistics at face value16,the
negative coefficient for “business”is significant at the 5 per cent level.It is im-
plausibly large: if the median council member has a business degree rather
than an economics degree, the inflation rate drops by 5.7 percentage points.
This may be due to the fact that the median does not change very often over
time.
TheprofessionalbackgroundisanalyzedinTable6.Here,thereferencegroup
is economic scholars because the median position was never occupied by a
politician.The estimate confirms that former central bank staff is most averse
to inflation and that they prefer a significantly lower inflation rate than eco-
nomic scholars do.Moreover,former bankers,businessmen and civil servants
also vote for a significantly lower inflation rate than economic scholars do.
Once more,the regression coefficients are implausibly large.




5. Summary and conclusions
The analysis leaves no doubt that the inflation rate depends on the profes-
sional background of the members of the central bank council. If the central
bank is independent and the exchange rate is flexible,former members of the
central bank staff pursue the most anti-inflationary policies, whereas former
trade unionists and politicians are most inflation prone. Former commercial
Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation 15
Regression on the median of the educational background – fixed effects
Dependent variable:inflation rate lagged two years









Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statistics in parentheses.– Number of observations:79.See appendix Table 7 for a description of
the variables.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The
reference group is economics.
Table 5
16 In a two stage procedure,the assumption of a t-distribution is less likely to be warranted.bankers and businessmen also prefer a lower inflation rate than trade union-
ists and politicians do. All these differences are significant at least at the five
per cent level.
If the median in the central bank council is a former staff member, banker,
businessman or civil servant (in this order), the inflation rate is significantly
lowerthanifaneconomicscholarholdsthemedianposition.Itseemsthateco-
nomic scholars are more likely to take a Keynesian view of the world than the
practitioners do.
The effects of educational background on inflation are much less robust. To-
gether with the professional variables, educational background is never
significant at the five per cent level,if the central bank is independent and the
exchange rate is flexible. However, if the central bank is dependent or if the
exchange rate is fixed, education seems to affect the ability to persuade the
government.Students of law plead for a higher inflation rate,and students of
business favour a lower inflation rate than economists do.
Studentsofbusinessalsopreferasignificantlylowerinflationratethanecono-
mists in a regime of central bank independence and flexible exchange rates if
theprofessionalvariablesareomittedinamedianvoteranalysis.Ifthemedian
member of the central bank council has studied business,our estimate yields a
5.7 percentage point lower inflation rate than if she has studied economics.
Admittedlythisestimateismerelysuggestive.Butitisquiteinlinewithourre-
sults for the professional variables: the study of economics, both as a student
16 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
Regression on the median of the professional background (last position) – fixed effects
Dependent variable:inflation rate lagged two years
Variable Effect if flexible exchange rate and independence
Other civil servant –3.740 ***
(–3.73)











Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statistics in parentheses.– Number of observations:79.See appendix Table 7 for a description of
the variables.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The
reference group is economic scholars.
Table 6and as a scholar,has significantly raised the preferred inflation rate relative to
other activities.
This raises a puzzle.Are not the former members of the central bank staff also
predominantly economists? They were found to have the strongest inflation
aversion. There are two ways of reconciling these results. First, central banks
mayprimarilyattracteconomistswhobelongtotheminorityofmonetarycon-
servatives (“self-selection”). Alternatively, economists who work in a central
bank may tend to become monetary conservatives because they are exposed
tocertainideas17orcometosharecertainvestedinterests(“déformation”–or
rather “formation”? – “professionnelle”).
Both educational and professional background contribute to explaining the
monetary policies and inflation record of central bankers.
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Description of the variables
Variable Description
Economics studied economics
Business studied business management or something similar or completed an
apprenticeship in a bank
Law studied law
Engineering studied engineering
Other subjects defined for all other educations such as languages,philosophy,psycho-
logy or public administration
Banker employed in a bank either commercial or public but not in a central
bank
Insurance executive worked for an insurance company
Central bank staff worked in a central bank
Businessman managed a company as a director or member of the executive board,
belonged to employers or industry association or was self-employed,in
regressions including also farmers and lawyers
Trade unionist worked for a labour union
Economic scholar researcher at an institute or university (mostly as a professors of eco-
nomics)
Ministerial civil servant worked in a ministry,includes state secretaries
Other civil servant worked in other public institutions like public banks (not central
banks) or international organisations
Politician former minister or parliamentarian (or both)
Table 720 Silja Göhlmann and Roland Vaubel
Regression on the educational background – fixed effects





















































F-Test of joint significance
of edu./prof.variables
1.57 16.58 2.15 6.40
p-value4 0.1705 0.0000 0.0945 0.0020
Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statisticsinparentheses.Totalnumberofobservations:291.Thenumberofobservationsforeach
regimeisindicatedattheheadofthecolumns.SeeappendixTable7foradescriptionofthevaria-
bles.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The referen-
ce group is economics.– 4p-value of the F-Test-statistics of joint significance.
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Regression on the professional background (last position) – fixed effects



















































































F-Test of joint significance
of edu./prof.variables
2.99 6,88 8.16 6.69
p-value4 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statistics in parentheses. – Total number of observations: 291. The number of observations for
each regime is indicated at the head of the columns.See appendix Table 7 for a description of the
variables.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The re-
ference group is politicians.– 4p-value of the F-Test-statistics of joint significance.
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Regression on the professional background (all positions) – fixed effects





















































































Authors’ calculations. – *significant at 10 %;**significant at 5 %;***significant at 1 %, robust
t-statisticsinparentheses.Totalnumberofobservations:291.Thenumberofobservationsforeach
regimeisindicatedattheheadofthecolumns.SeeappendixTable7foradescriptionofthevaria-
bles.Regressions were estimated including country and time dummies for each year.The referen-
ce group is politicians.
Table 10